Talking more about deflationary theories of truth on walk with Peretz. Think that Peretz tends to take "'p' is true iff p" as indicating that truth isn't significantly predicable of things because of historical accidents like our logics tending to take assertions as primitives (with semantics generally following suit), I'm more prone to take it as indicating something informative about the pragmatics of assertions, that is, when someone asserts something, they are additionally implying that it is true. The other thing that Peretz seems to lose sight of here is that truth is equally predicable of things which aren't tokens of assertions, take "My aim is true" as an example, even if one wants to see 'true' as being used metaphorically or some such way here, the question is then "What is the basis of the metaphor?" I suppose Peretz could claim 'true' was being used merely homophonously, I guess I just don't find this persuasive. In any case, I don't think anything about any of this implies anything about the existence or nonexistence of a property 'truth', however desirable it might be to do so. Anyway, it's not like it was a bad fight or anything, we're sitting together on the couch now, resting.